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Why Do They Do It?–A Brief Inquiry 
into the Real Motives of Some of the 
Participants in the Recording, 
Transcribing, Translating, Editing, 









It is not entirely clear why Aboriginal communicators, generally 
elders, chose to tell the traditional stories of their nation to non-
Aboriginals (generally social scientists) who came calling on them in 
the past. It is moreover by no means clearer what precisely their 
motives and their expectations were in telling those particular stories 
to those particular individuals at that particular time. Nevertheless, 
we can safely speculate that until fairly recently their motives were 
probably altruistic. A tactic commonly used by anthropologists and 
other social scientists seeking the collaboration of Aboriginals when 
“in the field” doing “participant observation,”1 consists in pretending 
to be almost as ignorant of the subtleties of their host culture as a 
small child or even an infant of that culture would be; this, in the 
hope that knowledgeable adults in the society might be moved to 
instruct them in what they would need to know in order to become 
                                                 
1 Participant Observation: Direct field observation that can lead to a fuller 
understanding of the sociocultural realities than could be gained by reliance 
on secondary sources. (from Glossary of Anthropological Terms: 
http://www.wadsworth.com/anthropology_d/special_features/anthro_glossar
y.html - consulted May 12, 2006) 
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fully-functional adult members of that society. The reasoning behind 
this tactic is that once so instructed they would be able to speak and 
write knowledgeably about that society. In most Aboriginal societies 
the task of instructing the young traditionally fell to the elders, no 
doubt because, of all the adults, they had the most free time to devote 
to that particular task, and also because, as the eldest, they were 
usually also the most knowledgeable about all aspects of their culture. 
This is why in most past cases we probably need look no further into 
those elders’ motivations in telling their traditional stories to visiting 
strangers. In oral cultures, after all, the telling of traditional stories is 
generally the means by which children are educated. What is not 
clear, however, is how aware those elders were of the ultimate goal 
of their foreign “pupils,” which was generally not so much a matter 
of becoming proficient in the culture per se, as to “mine”2 the elders 
for knowledge about their culture; knowledge which could then serve 
as raw data, or ore, that could eventually be processed or refined into 
learned academic articles and books, as well as serve as the raw 
material to be transformed into courses taught to university students.  
 
If the motives of the elders were most probably largely 
unselfish in nature, those of the social scientists whom they 
instructed, however, are not so easily defined. Mary Louise Pratt 
suggests that the motives of social scientists in recording, 
textualizing, translating, editing and publishing Aboriginal narratives, 
though sometimes no doubt partly altruistic, may often be 
considerably more besides. As an example Pratt cites Marjorie 
Shostak’s famous book Nisa (1981), which Shostak wrote following 
her participant observation field work among the people whom she 
and her Harvard Kalahari Project colleagues call the !Kung (the 
better to set themselves apart from the 300 years worth of travel 
writers and “amateur” ethnographers who have been writing about 
and studying the same people, otherwise, and better known, as the 
Bushmen). She notes that Shostak naively states that she wanted to 
study the !Kung because she hoped that the !Kung women would be 
able to,  
                                                 
2 For this metaphor of Academics « mining » Aboriginal Elders for nuggets 
of traditional knowledge that they can then “refine” into theses, articles and 
books, I am indebted to linguist André Bourcier of Whitehorse’s Yukon 




clarify some of the issues raised by the American women’s 
movement [because] their culture, unlike ours, was not being 
continuously disrupted by social and political factions telling them 
first that women were one way, then another. Although the !Kung 
were experiencing cultural change, it was still quite recent and 
subtle and had thus far left their traditional value system mostly 
intact. A study revealing what !Kung women’s lives were like 
today might reflect what their lives had been like for generations, 
possibly even for thousands of years. (Shostak 1981, p. 6–quoted 
in Pratt, 1986, p. 48) 
 
Shostak’s words betray a belief in the notion of “primitive,” 
“timeless,” “missing link” peoples, or “people without history” (Wolf, 
1982). It is a belief that persists (though probably unconsciously) 
among today’s social scientists who study far-off cultures hoping to 
shed light on the ways of our own remote ancestors. Their ultimate 
goal is to determine what we would naturally be like if our culture, 
like that of the American women whose lives Shostak hopes to 
enlighten through her work, “was not being continuously disrupted 
by social and political factions.” They hope to accomplish this by 
studying the ways and culture of peoples who have “failed to 
evolve.” They almost always characterise their work as extremely 
urgent, arguing that nearly pristine traditional cultures such as that of 
the !Kung cannot long survive in today’s bewildering world and must 
therefore be studied quickly before they disappear forever. As Mary 
Louise Pratt points out, however, 
 
‘Recent’ and ‘subtle’ are not the adjectives that come to mind 
when one ponders the grim history of the Bushman conquest. […] 
Is it not worth even asking the question whether 300 years of 
warfare and persecution at the hands of white settlers (to say 
nothing of the competition with indigenous pastoralists) have had 
an impact on the life-ways, the consciousness, the social 
organization, even the physiology of the group undergoing these 
traumas? Did the long-term practice of massacring men and 
enslaving women have no impact on ‘what women’s lives were 
like’ or how women saw themselves? What picture of the !Kung 
would one draw if instead of defining them as survivors of the 
stone age and a delicate and complex adaptation to the Kalahari 
desert, one looked at them as survivors of capitalist expansion, and 
a delicate and complex adaptation to three centuries of violence 
and intimidation? (1986, pp. 48-49)  
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Mary Louise Pratt further argues that “Modern ethnography 
obviously lies in direct continuity with this tradition [of literary travel 
writing], despite the disciplinary boundary by which it separates 
itself off from travel writing” (1986, p. 35). Anthropology, contends 
Pratt, strives rather desperately to give a “scientific” tone to its 
writing, which, to many people, makes it just plain boring, and that is 
why many anthropologists add a sometimes lengthy foreword or 
introduction to their ethnographies in which they indulge in more 
literary narration explaining how they came to be with this other 
culture, the early difficulties they encountered getting accepted 
within the culture, and something of their adventures. That is usually 
the part of their book that is most memorable. After this initial 
exercise, however, they must settle down to “serious (and dull) 
science,” or risk the chastisement of their fellow ethnographers. 
Alternatively, ethnographers write two books: the serious, scientific, 
ethnography, and, later, a second and more literary book narrating 
their field adventures. According to Pratt, anthropology as a 
discipline somewhat frowns upon the second book, but, as far as she 
could discover, no one has ever been formally disciplined for it (1986,  
pp. 27-35).  
 
 James Clifford argues that Shostak shapes Nisa’s life 
experience in such a way that, “this shaped experience soon becomes 
a story of ‘women’s’ existence, a story that rhymes closely with 
many of the experiences and issues highlighted in recent feminine 
thought” (1986, p. 104). Clifford argues that books like Nisa are in 
fact allegories “of scientific comprehension, operating at the levels 
both of cultural description and of a search for human origins…” and 
that “Nisa is a Western feminist allegory, part of the reinvention of 
the general category ‘woman’ in the 1970s and 80s. Nisa is an 
allegory of ethnography, of contact and comprehension” (Ibid.). But 
then, we might well ask, whose culture is actually being described in 
these allegories? Is it the (foreign, exotic) culture under study or is it 
that of the social scientist conducting the study? We might also ask in 
whose interest these narratives are being recorded, textualized, 
translated and eventually prepared for publication? Reflecting upon 
Shostak’s own stated reasons for recording, translating, editing and 
publishing Nisa’s life story, one may readily concede that her 
motives may well have been altruistic, but if so, her altruism appears 
to have been directed squarely toward her own society, not Nisa’s. 
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Clearly, the way individuals conduct social science, the precise 
lessons they draw from contact with another people, and the people 
who stand to benefit from such lessons very much depend upon the 
particular axe each social scientist chooses to grind. 
 
When Aboriginal Elders “educated” social scientists in the 
subtleties of their culture, they were of course speaking in their own 
native language, and thus it was necessary for the scientists to either 
enlist the help of a bilingual interpreter or to actually learn the 
language. When Nisa, the !Kung woman, told her life story to 
Marjorie Shostak, she spoke in her own native language and Shostak 
had to translate her words as a necessary step toward publishing them. 
In doing so, she was following in the footsteps of generations of 
other American ethnographers who, ever since the days of Franz 
Boas, have routinely recorded, transcribed, translated, edited and 
published the words of Aboriginal spokespersons. To Boas, whom 
some call the “father of American anthropology” (Anonymous, 
Wikipedia, 2006), and his followers, the potential difficulty of not 
knowing the language of their informants, far from being considered 
a drawback, was rather seen as a golden opportunity since it allowed 
them both to study the society’s language and its culture at one and 
the same time. According to William Clements, the generation of 
serious students of North American Aboriginal cultures who laid 
down the principles of the new (new in the late 19th century, at any 
rate) “science” of anthropology were primarily interested in 
recording, translating and textualizing Aboriginal narratives for the 
data that this could yield. “Their approach to the process of 
textualization, which became formalized under the auspices of the 
Smithsonian Institution’s Bureau of American Anthropology and in 
Boasian academic anthropology, yielded a healthy commitment to 
accuracy in recording and transcribing the verbal component of the 
material they encountered” (1996, p. 130). Although there is no 
doubt that Boasian anthropologists have added and continue to add 
much to our knowledge of non-Western cultures and languages, they 
have nevertheless come under considerable criticism of late, among 
other things for neglecting to account for or to convey any real sense 
of the “artfulness” of Aboriginal “oral performance” (Berman, 1992; 
Clements, 1996).  
 
 140
Fellow social scientists, however, are far from being the only 
critics of Boasian-style anthropology. For some years now, many 
Aboriginals have also been highly critical of the discipline, and well-
known American Indian activist, lawyer and academic, Vine Deloria 
Jr., has even accused anthropologists of being little more than 
“ideological vultures” (1969, p. 95). Stung by such charges, some 
anthropologists have reacted publicly. Writing in 1997, Elizabeth S. 
Grobsmith actually expresses a certain amount of gratitude towards 
Deloria because his writings have both helped her to acquire the 
“thick skin” that allows her to weather the occasional “unjust” 
criticism, and moved her to resolve from the very start of her career 
always to endeavour to determine what the most ethical possible way 
of proceeding is before posing any act in a professional capacity, and, 
should ethical proceeding ever prove impossible, never to proceed 
anyway. Grobsmith considers herself indebted to Deloria and argues 
that anthropology is, too, but she also clearly sees a need for 
tempering his critique and for developing a more nuanced assessment 
of anthropology’s relation to Aboriginal communities (1997, pp. 35-
49). Writing in the same publication, also in reaction to the writings 
of Vine Deloria Jr., Murray L. Wax explores both how anthropology 
has come to claim the authority to represent Aboriginal peoples and 
why that authority has become problematic. He also emphasizes 
Deloria’s insistence that only a researcher whose interests are tied to 
those of the community being studied will be able to produce work 
that is useful, desired by the community, and not colonial in nature 
(1997, pp. 50-60).  
 
One recent case in which two Canadian First Nations actually 
enlisted the help of several social scientists in a joint effort to bring 
about social and political change occurred in the Delgamuukw case. 
Delgamuukw refers to a 1991 judgement handed down in the British 
Columbia Supreme Court by Chief Justice Allan McEachern. The 
stakes of the trial were high for Aboriginals, involving as they did a 
bid by two north-western British Columbia First Nations–the Gitksan 
and the Wet’suwet’en–to not only force the Canadian federal and the 
British Columbia provincial governments to officially recognise their 
full legal ownership of over 22,000 square miles of BC’s north-
western Interior that they were claiming as their unceded ancestral 
lands, but that their inherent right to self-government be recognised 
as well. For a detailed, almost “blow-by-blow,” description of the 
 141
trial, Culhane, 1998, is an excellent starting point. My present 
interest in Delgamuukw, however, stems from the fact that the 
evidence presented in court by the Gitksan and the Wet’suwet’en was 
almost entirely based on oral traditions that they performed in court 
in their own traditional languages, forcing the Court to rely on 
translators and interpreters to follow their arguments. Needless to add, 
Delgamuukw provides considerable insight into the nature of 
traditional Aboriginal oral narrative, and therefore adds much to our 
understanding of what those narratives mean to at least some 
Aboriginal societies. One of the major stakes involved for the 
Gitksan and the Wet’suwet’en was getting the British Columbia 
Supreme Court to recognise the validity of their own oral-based 
traditional legal system as a duly constituted legal entity, empowered 
to recognise ownership of land long before the institution of the 
British legal system in colonial times. They hired their own legal 
counsel, which they directed throughout the trial, as well as a battery 
of social scientists who served as expert witnesses on their behalf–
corroborating evidence, as it were, for what was the main evidence of 
the traditional songs and narratives they performed before the Court. 
 
The Gitksan’s and Wet’suwet’en’s traditional legal system is 
based on witnessing (Yagalahl, 1992; Cruikshank, 1992; Culhane, 
1992, 1998). It is worth quoting part of anthropologist Julie 
Cruikshank’s explanation of how their oral traditions and the land are 
connected, and of how they performed their traditions as a form of 
witnessing before Justice McEachern’s court: 
 
Adaawk are central to the social organization of Gitksan Houses 
just as Kungax are central to the Wet’suwet’en Houses. They are 
the oral histories that document House ownership of land and 
resources and their performances at feasts publicly validate those 
claims. In performing their adaawk and Kungax, the hereditary 
chiefs were offering narratives with roots in two distinct traditions 
of storytelling. The Gitksan describe their Adaawk as a collection 
of sacred reminiscences about ancestors, histories and territories. 
The Wet’suwet’en speak of the Kungax as ‘a song of songs’ about 
trails between territories, the songs tying them to the land and 
impressing on listeners the importance of place. These songs, 
dances, and performances, lacking arbitrary beginnings or endings, 
may flow into one another, like a trail or a stream. The statement 
of Claim made to the court asserts that the expressions of 
ownership of land come through the Adaawk, Kungax, songs and 
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ceremonial regalia; that the confirmation of ownership comes 
through the totem poles erected to give those expressions a 
material base; and that the assertion of ownership of specific 
territories is made to the court through specific claims. In other 
words, there exists a complex relationship linking history, the 
performance of Adaawk and Kungax, and the land. (Cruikshank, 
1992, pp. 34-35)  
 
By performing their Adaawk and Kungax before the court the 
Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en were attempting to reconcile their own 
traditional legal system with the Canadian legal system. In effect, 
they were asking the Court to validate their claim to the land and to 
their inherent right to self-government by having it witness their 
performance of the Adaawk and the Kungax by which their claims 
are proven in their respective cultures, in the same way that, say, a 
Gitksan or Wet’suwet’en heir to a title and to the land that goes with 
it would validate his or her claim before their assembled community 
at a feast. That Justice McEachern ultimately rejected the Gitksan 
and Wet’suwet’en arguments outright (refused to acknowledge their 
claim as made through the performance of their Adaawk and Kungax, 
in the Gitksan’s and Wet’suwet’en’s own legal terms), according to 
Yagalahl, a member of the Gitksan nation, was partly because their 
nations’ histories, which they presented as evidence to his court, are 
not written down like those of Western nations, and because they 
were only transmitted orally: “And I guess this is one of the 
arguments that was (sic) used against us;” she said, “that there’s oral 
history and nothing is written. I guess it’s fine if anthropologists get 
this history and write it down and then it can be recognized” (1992, p. 
9). Speaking in 1992, long before the Supreme Court of Canada 
overturned part of the McEachern decision, Yagalahl was still 
understandably bitter over this rejection of her people’s legal system 
by the Canadian State as personified by the Chief Justice. 
Nevertheless, she felt that, far from weakening the Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en’s resolve, it would actually strengthen their 
determination to continue bearing witness to their grievances so as to 
have them in due course acknowledged, and ultimately righted by the 
official representatives of mainstream society. But there was also a 
lot of pain that needed to be expressed: 
 
When the oldest person was being cross-examined on his evidence 
he was 104 years old at the time. (…) And there he sat in the 
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witness stand, tiny, but sat very proud and answered with a very 
strong voice. And it was at this moment that I realized why we 
were there in court–when I saw him and the way he was answering. 
He was very strong, yet they were treating him like he was a 
criminal, sitting in the witness box. The only crime that we 
committed was being born Aboriginal people, descendants of 
Aboriginal people in this country. And it hurt. (1992, p. 10) 
 
And yet, in spite of the court’s rejection of her people’s claims and in 
spite of the pain, Yagalahl still felt that some measurable progress 
had been made: 
 
To me, it was a sad day when I heard that decision. And yet, in a 
way, I was happy because in a way it was a victory. A victory in a 
way that yes, our oral history was slammed around as we were 
witnesses on the witness stand, but we have it written in black and 
white now for anyone to see in those transcripts, in those 374 
volumes of transcripts. (Ibid., pp. 10-11) 
 
Here Yagalahl voices a dilemma that many Aboriginal 
communicators face. On the one hand, they have never before felt the 
need to have their oral traditions written down, and so they often 
have little interest in collaborating with social scientists to record, 
translate, textualize and ultimately publish their traditional narratives. 
On the other hand, they live amid a literal sea of non-Aboriginals, 
most of whom do not know the first thing about the traditions of any 
Aboriginal nation, and not a few of whom believe that Aboriginals 
have no true tradition of any sort anyway, that they are just 
“primitive” people who have no written traditions of their own for 
the simple reason that they never had any to write down in the first 
place. Here then are at least two recent motivations for some modern 
Aboriginal communicators to seek collaboration with social scientists 
in having their traditional narratives recorded, translated, textualized 
and ultimately published: one, so that the mainstream society knows  
that they and their traditions really do exist, and, two, so that their 
right to control and use their traditional territories as they see fit and 
so that their inherent right to govern themselves may both be 
acknowledged by mainstream officialdom.  
 
 The McEachern decision was finally overturned on appeal by 
the Supreme Court of Canada, but the highest court’s ruling did not 
by any means settle the question of Aboriginal land claims or that of 
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Aboriginal self-government in Canada. After hearing both sides’ 
arguments in the case on 16 and 17 June 1997 the Court released its 
decision on 11 December 1997. It ruled, first, that the land 
entitlement issue had been marred by certain procedural defects at the 
original BC Supreme Court trial and therefore ordered a new trial; 
second, that a new trial was needed in any case,  
 
so that the aboriginal perspective on their practises, customs and 
traditions and on their relationship with the land, are given due 
weight by the courts. In practical terms, this requires the courts to 
come to terms with the oral histories of aboriginal societies, which, 
for many aboriginal nations, are the only record of their past … 
[and which] play a crucial role in the litigation of aboriginal rights. 
(Hurley, 1998, par. 84)  
 
In other words, the Supreme Court of Canada advised that a new trial 
be conducted in order to determine the merits of the Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en land claims. And at this new trial, the Supreme Court 
expects lower courts to make special allowances for and not to act 
prejudicially toward those nations because their historical records 
exist only in oral form. This, of course, amounts to the Canadian 
State’s official recognition of the Gitksan’s and Wet’suwet’en’s oral 
traditions, and, by implication, of the oral traditions of all Canadian 
Aboriginal Nations as well. But if the Supreme Court did order a new 
trial, it did not “encourage a resumption of litigation, however, 
advising the parties to settle their disputes through negotiations 
instead” (Ibid.). 
 
 Oral testimony as a way of witnessing, of saying or naming 
and sharing one’s and one’s people’s pain and negative life 
experiences in the hope of ultimately obtaining some sort of redress 
by bringing them to the attention of the mainstream society is also 
fairly common. This may involve the telling of traditional narrative, 
it may involve the telling of one’s life story, and in some cases it may 
involve a combination of both.  
 
Lee Maracle is one of Canada’s best-known Métis writers. 
Her life story narrative, told in the first person to political activists 
Don Barnett and Rick Sterling in 1972, was published, first, in 1975 
under the pseudonym “Bobbi Lee,” and later republished with an 
update in Maracles’ own name in 1990. Though it does not involve 
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translation (Lee Maracle’s native language is English), it is 
nevertheless well worth describing briefly here because of the 
insights it provides on the process of recording, textualizing and 
publishing life story narratives, which more generally do involve 
translation. To quote the introduction to the 1975 edition by Rick 
Sterling of the LSM3 Information Centre:  
 
Early in 1972, when Bobbi was working in the LSM Information 
Center, several of us were preparing for work in Africa with 
liberation movements. As practice for doing life history 
documentation with African peasants, workers and guerrillas, we 
began recording each other’s life stories. Thus I recorded Bobbi’s 
story, realizing as we proceeded that its publication could greatly 
enhance our understanding of racism and the struggle of Native 
people. However, because of problems and contradictions in LSM 
and its Native members at that time, coupled with my own 
inexperience, it was impossible to complete the story in the same 
penetrating vein with which it was begun. Then, when the idea of 
publishing the story was seriously taken up again last year [1974], 
our late Information Center director, Don Barnett, re-recorded the 
latter years of Bobbi Lee’s life and brought it up to 1975. 
 
In her 1990 prologue to the same narrative, Lee Maracle writes: 
“There are two voices in the pages of this book, mine and Donald 
Barnett’s.” She also writes that the original Bobbi Lee narration was 
distilled out of a transcription about twice as long as the final 
published version. She recalls having had many arguments with the 
editors as to what should be included in the book and what left out. 
She writes that she did not always entirely approve of the style of the 
book’s passages, but that she eventually bowed to Don Barnett’s 
judgement. She states that when preparing the 1990 manuscript she 
considered rewriting the whole thing, but eventually opted not to. But 
recall Maracle’s words: “There are two voices in the pages of this 
book, mine and Donald Barnett’s.” What is particularly interesting in 
this publication is that Barnett’s and Sterling’s voices have been 
obscured behind a first person narrative style designed to give the 
                                                 
3 LSM stands for Liberation Support Movement, a Canadian West Coast 
more or less radical socialist collective that, among other things, published a 
number of books by African left-leaning political agitators. It appears to 
have largely ceased activities after Don Barnett’s death in 1975. 
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impression that the voice is Maracle’s alone. This, as I will show, is 
typical of a great many Aboriginal life history narratives.  
 
Strangely reminiscent of the textualization of Maracle’s life 
story narrative by social activists Sterling and Barnett is Elizabeth 
Burgos-Debray’s recording, translating, textualizing and publishing 
of Rigoberta Menchú’s telling of her life story. A member of 
Guatemala’s Quiché First Nation, Rigoberta Menchú is active in the 
struggle to improve her people’s lot in the face of the Guatemalan 
government’s often brutally repressive treatment. Her primary reason 
for confiding her life history to Burgos-Debray’s tape recorder 
appears to be a bid to embarrass the Guatemalan government into 
easing up on its treatment of the Quiché. Menchú spoke her story in 
Spanish and Burgos-Debray had it translated into English by Anne 
Wright, who writes that Rigoberta Menchú speaks:  
 
a mixture of Spanish learned from nuns and full of biblical 
associations … Spanish learned in the political struggle replete 
with revolutionary terms; and, most of all, Spanish which is 
heavily coloured by the linguistic constructions of her native 
Quiché and full of the imagery of nature and community 
traditions. … The problem of translation was how to retain the 
vitality, and often beautiful simplicity, of Rigoberta’s words, but 
aim for clarity at the same time. (From “Translator’s Note,” in 
Burgos-Debray, 1984, p. viii) 
  
Although I agree that Menchú’s language (in translation) is not 
complex, it is nevertheless perfectly adequate to express her often 
complex thoughts and descriptions. This is a very target-oriented 
translation–meaning that it retains virtually no trace of the original 
Spanish. In fact, Ann Wright’s translation makes Rigoberta Menchú 
sound like an average North American woman with above average 
education–perhaps someone not unlike Anne Wright? Be that as it 
may, what Rigoberta Menchú, Lee Maracle and Delgamuukw all 
have in common is storytelling, and (except in Maracle’s case) the 
use of translation in a bid by the narrators to free themselves and 
their people from an imperialistic government. Unlike the 
Delgamuukw case, however, the published versions of both 
Menchú’s and Maracle’s life history narratives are characterized by a 
typical obscuring of their recorders / transcribers / textualizers / 
editors / publishers’ own considerable part in the process.  
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 Sophie McCall argues that editors of Aboriginal first person 
narratives routinely achieve an appearance of pristine, exactly as told, 
narratives by obscuring their own active participation in the process. 
McCall cites Bakhtin’s insight that “still current in linguistics are 
such fictions as the ‘listener’ and ‘understander’…. These fictions 
produce a completely distorted idea of the complex and multifaceted 
process of active speech communication” (quoted in McCall 2002,   
p. 70). This is a crucial insight because the narrator does not sit alone 
in front of a tape recorder to which she tells her life history; she sits 
facing the ethnographer / linguist / historian / etc. The narrator tends 
to be intimidated by the process, and so her performance is usually 
anything but natural. She seldom speaks unprompted, but almost 
always in answer to her interlocutor’s direct questions. The recording 
usually takes place over the course of multiple sessions that can 
stretch over days, months and even years. Following each session the 
recorder / interviewer goes back to her home / office / hotel room / 
trailer / tent, where she transcribes the day’s tapes, analyses them, 
notes inconsistencies, and selects points for further elucidation. At 
the next recording session the very first thing that the narrator is 
asked to comment / elaborate on are precisely the points selected by 
the interviewer. The agenda is thus almost always entirely that of the 
interviewer, and even when the informant manages to retain a certain 
control over the recording process, the interviewer, by selecting and 
reordering the narrative after the fact, by controlling the translation 
process, and by doing the final editing without consulting with the 
narrator, still retains full control over what actually gets published 
and in what form. And yet, as McCall argues, this is routinely 
obscured, if not elided entirely.  
 
In the introduction to her 1984 edition of Rigoberta 
Menchú’s life history narrative, Elizabeth Burgos-Debray moreover 
betrays a good deal of sentimental attitude towards Aboriginals in 
general and Rigoberta Menchú in particular. This is the kind of 
anthropological writing (Burgos-Debray is an anthropologist) that 
James Clifford cautions against. He argues that virtually all 
ethnographic writing and the ethnographic life history narrative in 
particular is not only an allegory or a parable, but “a parable, almost 
always, in the pastoral genre.” It is a harkening back to a time and 
place where human relations were / have always been / still are more 
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humane; it is, argues Clifford, symptomatic of a yearning for a time 
before the fall, a yearning for Eden (1986). 
 
Consider ethnographer Burgos-Debray’s assertion about 
Rigoberta Menchú’s Quiché culture:  
 
Within that culture, everything is determined in advance; 
everything that occurs in the present can be explained in terms of 
the past and has to be ritualized so as to be integrated into every 
day life, which is itself a ritual. As we listen to her voice, we have 
to look deep into our own souls for it awakens sensations and 
feelings which we, caught up as we are in an inhuman and artificial 
world, thought were lost for ever. (1984, p. xii) 
 
Strangely, in Menchú’s narration (in Anne Wright’s English 
translation at least), there are virtually no traces of this pristine, 
“timeless” culture that Burgos-Debray describes. The woman that 
comes across the page is a very determined one who has no time for 
romantic notions of timeless pastoralism–she’s far too busy 
describing the harshness of her environment and struggling to make 
life better for herself and for her people to waste time on such fancies. 
 
Burgos-Debray describes the process of “collecting” 
Menchú’s life story as one of interviews that she conducted by 
questioning her informant using a running tape recorder. Each 
evening, she transcribed the day’s tapes and formulated a series of 
questions meant to clarify any ambiguous points before moving on to 
further life episodes, these last, also prompted by the ethnographer’s 
predetermined questions–hardly an undirected process. And yet 
Burgos-Debray chose to delete all of her own considerable 
interventions from the final publication:  
 
I soon reached the decision to give the manuscript the form of a 
monologue…. I therefore decided to delete all my questions…. I 
allowed her to speak and then became her instrument, her double 
by allowing her to make the transition from the spoken to the 
written word. […] I had to insert linking passages if the manuscript 
was to read like a monologue…. I followed my original 
chronological outline, even though our conversations had not done 
so, so as to make the text more accessible to the reader. (Ibid. p. xx) 
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Here, we are obviously in the presence of precisely the kind of 
editorial intrusion that Donald Barnett and Rick Sterling practiced in 
Bobbi Lee: Indian Rebel–same reworking of the transcription, same 
choosing which parts to include and which to leave out, same 
appearance of pristine, exactly as told narrative, same deliberate 
obscuring of the social scientist’s own active participation in the 
process, and a very similar sort of subversion of the informant’s 
narrative. In the case of Burgos-Debray this editorial intrusion 
reflects her own sentimental notions of timeless, pristine culture 
rather than the narrator’s, while in the Bobbi Lee case, the narrative 
was twisted so as to reflect Barnett’s and Sterling’s own radical 
socialist agenda, rather than Maracle’s particular concerns.  
 
Anthropologist Julie Cruikshank has spent a considerable 
amount of time working “in the field,” which in her particular case 
was the southern Yukon Territory, recording the life histories of three 
elderly Aboriginal women. She eventually published these in book 
form in 1990 (Cruikshank, 1990), but earlier, in 1983, she published 
a small portion of the same narratives by these three women in a 
“report” issued by The National Museums of Canada (Cruikshank, 
1983). She explains that she undertook the research that led to the 
production and publication of her 1983 report to fulfill a contract 
with the National Museums of Canada, which called for her to 
“record, transcribe and translate Athapaskan myths of the Tagish and 
Tutchone in southern Yukon Territory to (i) analyse the complexity 
of themes in these stories, and (ii) compare these stories with 
versions previously collected” (1983, p. 1). Once in the Yukon, 
however, Cruikshank quickly discovered that the three elderly 
Aboriginal women who collaborated with her preferred to self-
translate their own narratives, and they moreover all insisted in 
telling only those traditional stories that they wanted to tell, while 
further insisting that they would only tell these traditional stories as 
an integral part of the broader narratives of the history of their 
moieties, 4  of their families, and of selected autobiographical 
narratives. This is however never clearly and fully stated in either the 
1983 report, or the 1990 book, and only by reading both of them 
together can one begin to understand the circumstances and form in 
                                                 
4  Social scientists use the word “moiety” (after the French “moitié”) to 
designate each of the two descent groups into which the population of 
certain human groups fall. 
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which the “myths” and life history narratives on which both 
publications are based were “recorded” and edited for publication. 
 
Cruikshank does state that these “women seemed to consider 
these stories an essential component of personal history” (1983, p. 
24). And yet, in 1983 she presents all of their traditional narratives in 
disembodied form, amputated, as it were, from the broader narratives 
of which the narrators say they are integral parts. It is true that she 
had a contract to fulfill, which called for her to “record, transcribe 
and translate Athapaskan myths,” and given that personal history is 
not generally accepted within the definition of “myths,” she probably 
had little choice but to surgically separate the traditional narratives 
from the context of their telling in order to fulfill her contract. 
Another of the major themes of the 1983 report is also puzzling. 
Cruikshank states repeatedly (1983, pp. 12-19) that the stories 
presented in it can be divided into two categories: those with a male 
protagonist, and those with a female protagonist. She further states 
that those with male protagonists feature vision quests in the course 
of which the protagonist acquires a spiritual helper with whose 
assistance he then saves his community, while those with female 
protagonists feature women taken against their will on a journey to a 
parallel world from which they can only escape by performing 
ordinary domestic tasks exceptionally well. The problem with that 
assertion is that while some of the stories with female protagonists 
are similar to what Cruikshank describes; some of the other stories 
presented do not fall under her two stated categories. For example, 
the “Mountain Man Shat’okâw” story (1983, p. 75), and the “Wolf 
Man” story (1983,   p. 79), both feature women protagonists who go 
on vision quests from which they return with spiritual helpers with 
whose assistance they subsequently save their communities. 
 
Cruikshank presents some of these same traditional stories in 
her 1990 book Life Lived Like a Story, though in verse form similar 
to imagist poetry, and (in a way) accompanied by the life histories of 
which they were originally an integral part. I write “in a way” 
because, although the traditional narratives appear next to life 
histories in Life Lived Like a Story, they are not actually restored to 
their original position in the greater narrative into which they had 
been embedded by their narrators, but placed separately, in verse 
form, next to selected sections of life history narratives, some of 
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which, Cruikshank admits, were not necessarily those within which 
the tellers originally chose to tell them. To further set them apart 
from the traditional narrative sections, the life history narrative 
sections are presented in prose form. Why this difference in 
presentation? Are the traditional narratives presented in verse to 
make them appear more poetic? And is the goal in presenting the 
autobiographical narratives in prose form to make them appear more 
real? More true? But what of the tellers’ insistence that there is no 
difference between the life history narratives and the traditional 
narratives, that both are equally true and that they cannot be 
separated?  
 
 Julie Cruikshank also admits to having extensively edited 
the narratives for publication, but she insists that all the words 
appearing on the page are those of the contributors. Of one of the 
narrators, for example, she writes: “I have chosen to edit her account 
more than the others–not by changing her words, but by rearranging 
them to meet the grammatical demands of English when such 
reorganization seems to make her meaning clearer” (1990, p. 268). 
And, just as did Burgos-Debray, Shostak, and Sterling and Barnett, 
Cruikshank has also removed all traces of her own, also considerable, 
part in the process. Upon first reading them, Cruikshank’s 
textualizations of Tutchone and Tagish narratives appear to provide a 
reasonably good representation of Tutchone and Tagish worldviews. 
A closer look, however, reveals that they are selective, fragmented 
and personalized versions (Cruikshank’s) of those worldviews. These 
versions that may in fact, to again use the words of James Clifford, 
be allegories “of scientific comprehension, operating at the levels 
both of cultural description and of a search for human origins…”; 
and which, like Nisa, may well be more “a Western feminist allegory, 
part of the reinvention of the general category ‘woman’ in the 1970s 
and 80s....” (1986, p. 104), than a true representation of three elderly 
Aboriginal women’s own worldviews.  
 
The above claims, of course, beg the question: have any fair 
representations of Aboriginals’ worldviews been published? The 
short answer to that question is, perhaps. In 1999, anthropologist 
Dominique Legros published Northern Tutchone elder Tommy 
McGinty’s self-translation in English of his own Tutchone language 
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telling of his nation’s traditional creation narrative5. Legros had been 
gathering ethnographic data among the Tutchone ever since 1970 
when, as he puts it: 
 
At the beginning of my last long fieldwork (1990-91), their band 
council requested as a condition to my planned study that I now 
research and write for Them, not on Them for Them in the outside 
world, “down South.” Although worded less abruptly, in short, it 
requested that I become scribe to Mr. Tommy McGinty, one of the 
most learned elders in Tutchone culture and a long-time friend and 
ethnographic consultant. After discussion, part of Mr. Tommy 
McGinty’s project became taping in English all the sacred 
Tutchone narratives he knew and having me write them down as 
well as getting them published. (1999, p. 19) 
 
Legros’ work in general and his recording, transcription, 
textualization, editing and publication of Tommy McGinty’s 
narration in particular has yet to undergo the test of full and thorough 
analysis and therefore, at this point, should still be treated with 
caution. And whether collaborations such as Tommy McGinty’s and 
Dominique Legros’ will prove more satisfying to First Nations in the 
long run has yet to be determined. Strategies calling for elders to self-
translate their narratives orally for ethnographers or other social 
scientists to textualize and publish on their behalf are however 
probably only an intermediary step. Once elders become fully literate, 
why should they require the help of “scribes” to textualize their 
traditional narratives for them? In a 1995 paper presented at the 
McGill Institute for the Study of Canada’s Sixth Seminar, 
archaeologist and ethnohistorian Bruce Trigger suggested that they 
may well do their own “scribing” in a not so distant future when he 
asked: “Can Non-Native Scholars Write a History of the Native 
Peoples of North America? Will the Cambridge History of the Native 
Peoples of North America be the Last Scholarly Account of Native 
                                                 
5 I am well aware that traditional creation narratives are more usually called 
“creation myths;” however, I agree with Dominique Legros that “to use 
words like myth for an Other’s creation narrative is as crude, coarse and 
unacceptable as to address a Christian audience on the myth of Jesus or a 
faithful Jewish assembly on its myth of Exodus” (1999, p. 20). Accordingly, 
I am using the phrase “traditional narrative,” rather than the word “myth” 
throughout this article. 
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Peoples by Non-Aboriginal Scholars?” (Quoted in Legros, 1999,       
p. 21). 
 
Various forms of self-representations by Aboriginals in 
which highly controlled self-translation is involved and addressed to 
both fellow Aboriginals as well as to the non-Aboriginal public at 
large do in fact exist. I am thinking, for example, of Inuit filmmaker 
Zacharias Kunuk, whose award-winning feature film Atanarjuat, the 
Fast Runner was projected on screens all over the world in its 
original Inuktitut language version with subtitles in the local 
language of the audience appearing on-screen. This subtitling 
strategy, according to Sophie McCall, was not an innocent choice on 
the part of the Inuit filmmaker, whose “politics of partial translation” 
are a deliberate attempt at keeping ultimate control over traditional 
Inuit narrative in Inuit hands. The first part of the title of McCall’s 
2004 article (“I Can Only Sing This Song to Someone Who 
Understands It”) is taken from the opening scene of Igloolik Isuma 
Production’s now famous film in which a character (Kumaglak) 
refuses to sing his song for a mysterious stranger on grounds that the 
stranger would not understand it. “Kumaglak will not sing because he 
doesn’t know how the listener will receive, retell, and reuse the song 
for his own purposes. His suspicions prove to be well-founded: the 
‘up-north stranger’ murders him…” (2004, p. 19). McCall sees this 
scene, which opens the film, and especially the statement by 
Kumaglak as a metaphor of the way in which Euro-Canadians have 
plundered Inuit art, stories and songs and appropriated them for their 
own use with little regard for what they might have meant to those 
who created them. A film such as Atanarjuat, she argues, serves to 
allows Inuit artists to re-appropriate their own culture. Furthermore: 
 
The subtitled film enables the filmmakers to create two parallel 
texts that interact and speak to each other in complex and 
imperfect ways. The gap between what is spoken and what appears 
on the bottom of the screen can be manipulated strategically, for a 
variety of effects, enabling the filmmakers to address different 
audiences. The book version of Atanarjuat, by Paul Apak Angirlik 
and others, which includes screenplays in both languages (Inuktitut 
and English), film stills, interviews, personal essays, and 
ethnographic commentary, adds still more layered and variant 
tellings to the oral script. The film’s strategy of partial translation 
highlights the space of cultural contact and difference in acts of 
textualizing orature and orality. The filmmakers thus resist the 
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powerful explanatory impetus of the genre of the ethnographic film, 
which presumes to elucidate the roles and purposes of cultural 
practices for outsiders. (Ibid., pp. 26-27) 
 
 McCall further argues that anthologies that include Inuit 
songs–such as Edmund Carpenter’s Anerca (1959), Jerome 
Rothenberg’s Shaking the Pumpkin (1971), James Houston’s Songs 
of the Dream People (1972), John Robert Colombo’s Poems of the 
Inuit (1981), Penny Petrone’s Northern Voices (1988), Daniel David 
Moses and Terry Goldie’s An Anthology of Canadian Native 
Literature (1992-1998)–“have constructed the songs as imagist 
poems and isolated them from their original contexts. The 
presentation of the songs as isolated fragments ignores the 
storytelling interactions and the social contexts of the telling” (ibid., 
p. 21). In her article a good deal of space is devoted to comparing the 
1921 film Nanook of the North with Atanarjuat, which deliberately 
repeats several shots and scenes from Nanook, to “correct,” believes 
McCall, the false impressions of the culture given by the earlier film. 
She condemns the re-production of Inuit culture in out of context bits 
and pieces, and the appropriation by Euro-Canadians (or even by 
Aboriginal southern Canadians such as David Daniel Moses) of Inuit 
Orature, which they re-present in modified form that closely 
approximates forms of Western literary art (imagist poems, for 
example), or which they use as inspiration to create a Canadian 
literature that romanticizes the original Inuit Orature into something 
largely foreign to its original creators’ intents (Ibid., pp. 24-25).  
 
So why then do they do it? As indicated at the beginning of 
the article, the evidence suggests that in the past many Aboriginal 
Elders collaborated with social scientists for altruistic reasons. More 
recently, there is no doubt that Aboriginal communicators’ primary 
motivation is to bear witness to past wrongs perpetrated against them 
and their people by various agents of the mainstream society. They 
often do this in a bid to have those wrongs righted, or at least to bring 
about their cessation. In some cases, such as the Delgamuukw case, 
the witnessing takes place in a formal courtroom setting, and has had 
a small measure of success recently, though Aboriginal participants 
are far from satisfied and their struggles, in and out of the courtroom, 
are ongoing. As I have attempted to show, however, the motives of 
social scientists who seek the collaboration of these same Aboriginal 
communicators, although generally purported to be in the interest of 
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the advancement of scientific knowledge about “preindustrial” 6 
societies, as well as to have the best interest of Aboriginal Peoples at 
heart, often tend to reflect the worldviews of the social scientists and 
of the societies whence they sprang, rather than those of their 
Aboriginal collaborators. These social scientists moreover often 
routinely obscure their own considerable interventions and input into 
the process of the collaboration as well. 
 
Sophie McCall proposes a complete reversal of the current 
process of recording, transcribing, translating, textualizing and 
publishing Aboriginal narrative. Since the influence of the narrative’s 
collector / transcriber / translator / editor / publisher can never be 
eliminated entirely, she argues, the next best thing would obviously 
be to make it entirely transparent. This means that each and every 
action of all participants should be clearly laid out in the final 
publication. At the very least, it should mean publishing all of the 
interviewer’s questions, interventions and promptings during the 
recording process, as well as a candid description of all 
manipulations that the informants’ words have undergone throughout 
the process. McCall argues that “Bakhtin’s discussion of how 
‘heteroglossia’ emerges from rigidly hierarchical social relations is 
particularly relevant…” (2002, p. 75). A fully transparent publication 
of Aboriginal life history narratives would then clearly show that 
their production was a dialogic process, and not the purported 





                                                 
6 In a bid to do away with formerly commonly used, but connotatively 
pejorative, terms such as “primitive” to describe societies that have not 
chosen to adopt modern industrial lifestyles, many anthropologists, 
including James Peoples and Garrick Bailey in their cultural anthropology 
introductory textbook, Humanity (New York, West Publishing Company, 
1994), often use the term “preindustrial” in its stead, evidently failing to 
grasp that such a term remains potentially pejorative since it seems to imply 
that such societies have only managed to reach a lower level of development 
and are bound to eventually adopt a fully industrial life style, which, as the 
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ABSTRACT: Why Do They Do It?–A Brief Inquiry into the Real 
Motives of Some of the Participants in the Recording, 
Transcribing, Translating, Editing, and Publishing of Aboriginal 
Oral Narrative ─ This article inquires into the motives of the 
participants in the recording, transcribing, translating, editing and 
publishing of Aboriginal narrative. The motivation of Aboriginal 
communicators, at the outset simple altruism, has evolved onto a 
pressing need to bear witness to past and present wrongs perpetrated 
against them by various agents of the dominant society. Social 
scientists’ motivations are equally complex. Most of the social 
sciences, and particularly anthropology, practice translation. 
Anthropology has elaborated translation theories that betray a general 
unease with how and why anthropologists translate. Anthropological 
translation differs from that of other disciplines in that when 
anthropologists translate oral and written “texts,” their ultimate aim 
is in fact the “translation” of the cultures that produced them. 
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RÉSUMÉ : Pourquoi le font-ils? – Une brève enquête sur les 
motifs de certains des participants à l’enregistrement, la 
transcription, la traduction, la révision et la publication des récits 
oraux autochtones ─ Cet article analyse les motifs pour lesquels 
certains des participants acceptent l’enregistrement, la transcription, 
la traduction, la révision et la publication des récits autochtones. Les 
raisons d’agir des communicateurs autochtones, au départ 
caractérisées par un simple altruisme, ont évolué vers un besoin 
urgent de témoigner des torts, présents et passés, perpétrés contre eux 
par divers agents de la société dominante. Les motifs des sciences 
humaines sont également complexes. La plupart d’entre elles, et 
l’anthropologie en particulier, font appel à la traduction. Les théories 
de la traduction de l’anthropologie trahissent un malaise général 
envers ses pratiques et ses motifs traductifs. La traduction 
anthropologique diffère de celle des autres disciplines du fait que 
lorsque les anthropologues traduisent des « textes » oraux et écrits, 
leur but ultime est en fait la  « traduction » des cultures qui les ont 
produits.  
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